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Introduction
Corruption imposes enormous costs on firms and the societies they are embedded in; it is also a complex challenge that defies easy solutions (Doh et al. 2003; Rose-Ackerman 2006) .
Hence management scholars have increasingly devoted energy to studying this phenomenon.
The prior literature on corruption predominantly falls into three categories: it either takes a conceptual approach (e.g. Doh et al. 2003; Lee and Oh 2007) ; it discusses specific firm-level tools to combat corruption, like anti-corruption training or ethical leadership (Argandoña 2003; Schwartz et al. 2005) ; or it focusses on corporate engagement in specific countries, like China (Luo 2011; Zhu 2016) . Much of the management literature has furthermore focussed on how multinational enterprises (MNEs) from developed countries deal with these challenges (e.g. Kwok and Tadesse 2006; Murphy and Schlegelmilch 2013) . However, the last few decades have also witnessed the rise to economic prominence of firms that hail from developing countries (Guillén and Garcia-Canal 2009 ).
Corporate anti-corruption engagement can be seen as a specific expression of corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Osuji 2011) . Here, the wider CSR literature has started to investigate how institutional contexts shape a company's CSR engagement (Vogel 2006 Hence this paper will address two interrelated research questions: (1) What do developing country firms have to say about how they manage corruption? We will answer this more exploratory question through an analysis of the content of codes of conduct adopted by developing country firms from a total of 18 countries. (2) How is corruption-related code content shaped by a company's wider business environment? This question adopts a confirmatory perspective and builds on the literature on National Business Systems (NBSs) (Whitley 1999) and Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) (Hall and Soskice 2001).
Our paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. As a first contribution, we add a developing country firm perspective to the growing literature on the subject. Secondly, we explore the diversity of ways in which firms choose (not) to communicate their anticorruption engagement. Thirdly, we explain how the wider business environment shapes these differences in anti-corruption engagement. Our study provides evidence of the 'mirror view' of corporate social responsibility (Koos 2012; Brown and Knudsen 2015) , according to which companies match the quality of national-level institutions in their own commitments.
Therefore, whilst we also found participation in the UN Global Compact, as an example of an anti-corruption-related multi-stakeholder initiative, to have a positive impact on corporate anti-corruption commitments, our results generally highlight the limitations of initiatives that seek to simply subsume firms' anti-corruption engagements under an umbrella of voluntary, beyond-compliance CSR activities. Purely private governance mechanisms aimed at combatting corruption may ultimately be rendered ineffective by an inability or unwillingness of governments to regulate this aspect of economic activity.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section focusses on the nature of and corporate approaches to corruption with particular emphasis on developing countries.
In our theory development section, we apply a National Business Systems perspective and develop a set of hypotheses regarding factors that influence the extent to which developing country firms communicate anti-corruption engagement in codes of conduct. Thereafter we describe the research methods applied in this study. This is followed by the results of our content analysis of codes of conduct as well as a two-level Bernoulli regression analysis we use to test our hypotheses. Subsequently, we discuss key results of our analysis and potential implications for policymakers and corporate practitioners. The paper concludes with a discussion of its limitations as well as avenues for future research.
Literature Review

The nature of corruption
Corruption has been defined as the "misuse of an organizational position or authority for personal or organizational (or subunit) gain, where misuse in turn refers to departures from accepted societal norms" (Anand et al. 2004, p. 40) . Corruption is an important topic for management studies because of the high costs and greater risks it imposes on firms and the societies they operate in (Jain 2001; Doh et al. 2003; Svensson 2005) . Corruption imposes direct costs on firms they otherwise would not face, such as bribes for corrupt government officials (Doh et al. 2003) . The World Bank estimated that world-wide bribery amounts to at least US$ 1 trillion a year (Rose-Ackerman 2004).
At societal level, corruption fosters inefficiency by distorting market signals and misallocating resources (Langseth et al. 1997) . Corrupt governments have less funds available to spend on education, welfare and infrastructure (Mauro 1995) , which further reduces opportunities for economic growth (Svensson 2005) . Corruption can also influence the distribution of income within a society, often to the detriment of its less powerful members (Jain 2001) . Additionally, corruption weakens key societal institutions, like courts and regulatory agencies (Doh et al. 2003) . Last but not least, corruption has a dynamic quality: it is not the corrupt act by an individual official that is problematic; rather, if left unchecked, corruption can lead to further erosion of existing governance structures (Ashforth et al. 2008) .
A number of authors have argued that corruption is a particular challenge in developing countries (Treisman 2007; Venard and Hanafi 2008) .
1 Developing countries have a greater need for generating economic growth through attracting international investment, yet corruption poses a direct threat to achieving that growth (Svensson 2005) as well as significantly higher transaction costs for firms wishing to operate in these markets (Doh et al. 2003; Luo 2011) . In many such countries, corruption results from deficiencies in the quality of political institutions, under-developed legal systems and low salaries of civil servants (Venard and Hanafi 2008) .
Anti-corruption in the Context of Corporate Social Responsibility
Historically, the main way of addressing corruption has been through government legislation. 
Corporate Approaches to Addressing Corruption
Given the implementation deficits of regulatory and self-regulatory initiatives, a key question with regard to corruption is how companies themselves address this challenge (Gordon and However, adopting any one of the anti-corruption strategies is far from easy. At the individual level, tackling corruption is made difficult by a range of rationalization strategies organizational members may use to neutralize any negative feelings, while new members are induced to accept these practices through socialization (Anand et al. 2004) . At the firm level, companies are concerned that "exposing corrupt behaviors will reduce profits or anger corrupt officials without changing the behavior of others" (Doh et al. 2003, p. 115) . The development and execution of a firm's anti-corruption strategy is thus an important issue, in particular in an era with a heightened emphasis on corporate governance and social responsibility (Luo 2011). A range of tools and initiatives can help to support a firm's anticorruption strategy, not least corporate code of conduct.
Codes of Conduct and Corruption
The code of conduct is one of the most widely adopted CSR tools (KPMG 2008; Wheldon and Webley 2013 developing countries have made significant strides towards maturity in the design and adoption of codes of conduct; however, the body of literature on developing firm codes is not extensive, and this applies in particular to studies into commitments to address the challenge of corruption.
Theory building
We propose to examine the engagement of developing country firms with the challenge of corruption first through the concept of national business systems (NBS) (Whitley 1999; Witt and Redding 2014) or varieties of capitalism (VoC) (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hanké et al. 2007 ), but also consider the role of multi-stakeholder initiatives aimed at anti-corruption.
Whitley (1999, p. 33) defines national business systems as "distinctive patterns of economic organization that vary in their degree and mode of authoritative coordination of economic activities, and in the organization, and interconnections between owners, managers, experts, and other employees". He then draws out four major elements of an NBS, (1) the political system, (2) the financial system, (3) the education and labour system and (4) the cultural system. 2 Crucially, for the overall business system to be successful, its elements need to complement each other to form a coherent logic for economic activity.
The prior literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) identified two distinct ways in which NBS elements may prompt corporate responses, namely a 'substitute' and a 'mirror'
view (Koos 2012; Brown and Knudsen 2015) . From the substitute perspective, less robust national institutions engender greater firm engagement to compensate for deficiencies at national level; from the mirror perspective, high quality national institutions inspire firms to mirror these lofty standards in their own commitments. Applied to the challenge of corruption, deficient national-level institutions may encourage firms to unilaterally adopt anti-corruption measures; alternatively, the application of such tools may be encouraged by a high quality of national-level institutions.
The Political System. According to Whitley (1999, p. 48) , countries differ in the extent to which states "directly or indirectly regulate market boundaries, entry and exit, as well as set constraints on the activities of economic actors". The political system clearly shapes the context in which corruption prevails or is effectively addressed. For example, are certain corrupt practices generally accepted in a given country? Do government officials publicly condemn corruption? Has the state established effective institutions in order to combat corruption? Thus, corruption tends to thrive in countries that do not hold regular elections, depriving citizens of the opportunity to remove corrupt officials.
We expect the political system to influence how companies respond to corruption. Given the nature of corruption, we expect companies' anti-corruption engagement to reflect the 'mirror view' of corporate social responsibility (Koos 2012; Brown and Knudsen 2015) , according to which companies match the quality of national-level institutions in their own commitments.
In countries with high levels of corruption, companies that publicly adopt an anti-corruption stance may ultimately expose themselves to the risk of losing out on new commercial opportunities (Doh et al. 2003) . Consequently, we would expect a negative link between the extent to which corruption is perceived to exist in a given context and the likelihood of companies publicly communicating their anti-corruption engagement.
Hypothesis 1a. Lower perceived levels of corruption in a country will make it more likely that a company headquartered there addresses corruption in its code of conduct
Another political factor that may influence the likelihood of a company committing itself to anti-corruption is a country's degree of press freedom (Svensson 2005) . Restrictions on press freedom have been found to be associated with higher levels of corruption (Treisman 2007; Camaj 2013) . In contrast, a higher degree of press freedom should lead to higher levels of public awareness of corruption and thus higher levels of public pressure on a company to adopt a position in the fight against corruption. Blanc et al. (2017) find robust empirical evidence for the positive impact of the degree of press freedom on a company's likelihood of disclosing its anti-corruption commitment in corporate sustainability reports. Along similar lines, we would expect companies in countries characterized by high levels of press freedom to be more outspoken about anti-corruption in their codes of conduct. (Allen and Gale 2000) . In addition to domestic sources of finance, the financial system also entails the option to raise capital abroad, whether through international bank loans or foreign direct investment (FDI).
However, access to international financial markets imposes additional conditions on firms as investors are likely to be averse to corruption in host countries, in particular since anticorruption legislation, like the FCPA in the US, often applies penalties to international as much as national transactions (Hines 1995 of the "system for developing and controlling skills". A crucial aspect of the education system refers to a preference for general or for vocational education. While the former is transferable between jobs and hence more suitable for a flexible workforce, the latter provides job-specific knowledge and can make employees more productive (Becker 1993).
Although human capital attained through formal education is a critical determinant of economic progress, many developing countries continue to lag behind in terms of adult educational attainment (Barro and Lee 2001). Of course, there are again huge differences across this diverse group of countries; not least the so-called Asian Tigers grew rapidly by relying on a well-educated and conscientious labour force (Frenkel and Yu 2014) .
The relationship between the level of education in a country and its level of corruption is likely to be complex and multi-faceted: higher education levels should improve the capacity of civil society to monitor government activities and therefore decrease levels of corruption, but may also increase expected corruption rents and therefore increase levels of corruption (Eicher et al. 2009 Research by Hofstede (1980) and successor studies like GLOBE (House et al. 2004 ) have identified a range of elements of culture where countries differ from each other, such as power distance, individualism versus collectivism, long-term orientation or uncertainty avoidance. These elements have important implications for the functioning of NBSs and VoCs, as they influence the degree of inter-firm collaboration and the delegation of control over resources within a company (Lane and Bachmann 1998).
Power distance has emerged as an influential construct, which can be defined as "the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally" (Hofstede 1991, p. 28). Countries characterized by high power distance tend to be more paternalistic, with decision-makers prioritizing loyalty rather than merit (Husted 1999) . Such countries have been found to be more prone to corruption, in particular in the form of favouritism and nepotism; while corrupt practices are also more likely to be tolerated in high power distance countries (Cohen et al. 1996; Husted 1999) . Relatedly, power distance has been found to be negatively associated with the adoption of corporate policies on bribery and corruption and/or codes of conduct Analogously, we expect that participation in multi-stakeholder initiatives aimed at combatting corruption will also increase the likelihood of a company addressing corruption in its code of conduct.
Hypothesis 5. Participation in multi-stakeholder initiatives aimed at anti-corruption
will make it more likely that a company addresses corruption in its code of conduct.
Research methods
As corruption is difficult to measure directly (Torsello and Venard 2016), we followed the example of authors like Gordon and Miyake (2001) Codes of conduct were obtained through a search of the respective company websites, as these are an approved, formal and official expression of corporate policy (Bondy et al.
2008
).We used a multi-stage coding process similar to a thematic analysis technique (Huberman and Miles 1994) in order to process the codes of conduct. In a first step, we identified all statements in the codes that referred to corruption using keywords such as After an initial descriptive analysis of corruption-related code content, a hierarchical linear modelling technique was used to examine how a number of contextual variables shaped the corporate communication of anti-corruption commitments. We focus here specifically on statements about the enforcement of specific anti-corruption commitments, as information disclosure on enforcement mechanisms constitutes a substantive response to anti-corruption.
Building on previous empirical studies that used the NBS/VoC framework for international comparative analyses (Whitley 1999; Ioannou and Serafeim 2012), we employed the framework to explore relationships between the elements of a national business system and the extent to which companies discuss corruption in their codes of conduct. The independent variables used to test the different NBS dimensions are presented in Table 1 .
[insert Table 1 [insert Table 2 about here]
Findings
Code Content Analysis
The 293 statements can be grouped into four main categories (see Table 2 ; for typical quotes, Although smaller than the first two, this category is again important in terms of making company commitment more credible.
A fourth category of statements discusses the enforcement of code commitments by the firm (39 statements; 13.3 percent), for example by stating that illegal or unethical acts will be subject to disciplinary action up to termination of employment. Some codes also provide a reassurance that employees who report suspected acts of corruption do not have to fear any retaliation (7 statements; 2.4 percent). Finally, a number of companies mention additional tools in their codes of conduct (37 statements). These range from a stand-alone AntiCorruption Policy through the provision of online-training on the topic to the establishment of a Fraud Hotline, where employees can report suspected cases of corruption. Such tools are another important indicator of how thorough a company's commitment to addressing corruption is.
Multi-level Regression Analysis
Our second research question inquires how corruption-related code content is shaped by the elements of its country's national business system as well as by multi-stakeholder initiatives, such as the UN Global Compact. We employ a two-level HLM Bernoulli regression analysis to examine variation in companies' anti-corruption commitments as expressed in their codes of conduct. As shown above, these types of commitments range from merely aspirational statements to substantive obligations, such as specific enforcement mechanisms or reassurances that employees reporting suspected acts of corruption will not have to fear any retaliation. The two-level Bernoulli regression analysis will help us to explore patterns in the substantive commitments made by the sample firms (categories 4a and 4b in Table 2 ). More specifically, we examine contextual factors that seem to drive companies to make these commitments. A correlation matrix for the variables that we used in the regression analysis is presented in Appendix 2. A high degree of correlation exists between Human Development Index scores and Education Attainment scores. However, multicollinearity diagnostics show that Variance Inflation Factors are well below the threshold level of 10 (Myers 1990) , and therefore we do not expect multicollinearity issues to affect our analysis.
The results of the two-level Bernoulli regression analysis focussing on substantive commitments as the dependent variable are reported in Table 3 [insert Table 3 about here]
Discussion
Implications for research into corruption and CSR
Our analysis has shown a considerable amount of diversity in the ways in which developing country firms voice anti-corruption engagement in their codes of conduct. At a first glance, it looked like the firms in our sample would extensively engage with this topic. After all, 72.8 percent of codes by firms from across 18 countries addressed corruption. At a second glance, however, it emerged that many of the anti-corruption statements were merely of an aspirational nature, rather than offering concrete commitments. This finding tallies with a long-standing criticism of codes of conduct that such documents often vary considerably between companies in terms of how specific their monitoring and compliance procedures are We then adopted the NBS framework to explain some of the variation in the extent to which companies publicly commit to anti-corruption enforcement mechanisms. Overall, the framework has proven a useful lens for this purpose. Our results show that code content in relation to anti-corruption is significantly more shaped by the wider institutional context rather than by company-level characteristics. Whilst UN Global Compact membership is found to have a positive impact on a company's likelihood of publicly positioning itself against corruption, the distribution of statements on enforcement mechanisms across our sample companies more generally supports the "mirror view" of corporate social responsibility (Koos 2012; Brown and Knudsen 2015) : companies appear to be more likely to adopt specific enforcement mechanisms in contexts in which corrupt practices (TI 2011) (as measured by Corruption Perception Index scores) appear to be less widespread, thereby supporting hypothesis 1. It is important to stress that this picture emerges irrespective of company size or (to a large degree) sector affiliation, even though prior studies have found corruption to be more widespread among smaller companies (TI 2008) and in resourceintensive sectors, such as oil and gas or mining (TI 2011). In other words, when designing their anti-corruption strategies and tools companies appear to respond to wider national-level institutional contexts rather than operational necessities at the firm level.
This overarching picture of corporate anti-corruption engagement as a mirror of the quality of It should be noted that this overarching picture of corporate anti-corruption engagement as a mirror of corruption-related standards in a country does not appear to extend to the wider institutional contexts as postulated in hypotheses 2-4. Therefore, hypotheses 2-4 need to be rejected. Degrees of press freedom (hypothesis 1b) and levels of integration into the world economy (as measured by FDI as a percentage of GDP; hypothesis 2) were not found to have a significant impact on companies' likelihood of publicly committing to anti-corruption enforcement mechanisms. Education attainment scores were in fact significantly negatively related to firms' likelihood to communicate substantive engagement in anti-corruption (rather than positively related, as postulated in hypothesis 3). Likewise, and in contrast to hypothesis 4, firms headquartered in countries with higher power distance are significantly more likely to voice their anti-corruption engagement with regard to specific enforcement mechanisms.
However, bivariate correlation coefficients (Appendix 2) point to an anomaly in our sample in that a significantly positive correlation can be identified between power distance and Corruption Perceptions Index scores, where a country is seen as less corrupt the higher its score. Therefore, the widespread argument for a positive link between power distance and levels of corruption (Cohen et al. 1996; Husted 1999) is not supported for the countries included in our sample. Future research, employing a larger sample including a wider range of countries might be able to generate more conclusive findings regarding these relationships.
Implications for Practitioners and Policymakers
Corporate codes of conduct can play an important role in guiding the conduct of organizational members (Carasco and Singh 2003) while signalling that the issuing firm is a responsible societal actor (Cressey and Moore 1983) . Given that a company's engagement with the challenge of corruption is difficult to measure directly, codes of conduct could be a reasonable proxy for such measurements. Such information would be of value to several external audiences. Not least investors are likely to appreciate reassurances that a company operating in a relatively corrupt society is actively engaging with this challenge. After all, they risk not only losing their investment due to corruption but -given the extraterritorial reach of much anti-corruption legislation like the FCPA in the US -potentially also incurring legal penalties.
In this context, Gordon and Miyake (2001) had found that the OECD firms in their sample deploy a fairly homogeneous set of practices and tools to address the challenge of corruption.
They suggested that a de facto standard practice of addressing corruption might be emerging.
Our findings sound a more cautionary note: while aspirational statements on addressing corruption are wide-spread, concrete commitments were at lot rarer (e.g. only 13.3% of all statements discussing code enforcement mechanisms). Thus many codes in our sample fall short of minimum requirements with regard to code quality, in particular for monitoring, compliance and enforcement (Van Tulder et al. 2009; Kaptein 2011) . Hence, if an international standard approach is indeed developing, then it would seem that the evidence for this is more clearly visible in OECD country firms that the developing country firms in our sample. 
Conclusions
The paper started with the twin observations that corruption is both pervasive and rampant, in We then applied a national business systems (NBS) lens to investigate how corruption-related code content is shaped by the elements of the NBS of the country from which the firm hails, honing in on the cases where companies make substantial anti-corruption commitments. The distribution of the respective statements across our sample companies supports the "mirror view" of corporate social responsibility (Koos 2012; Brown and Knudsen 2015) : companies appear to be more likely to adopt specific enforcement mechanisms in countries where corrupt practices are less widespread. Whilst we do find anti-corruption-related multistakeholder initiatives, taking the example of the UN Global Compact, to have a positive impact on firms' likelihood of committing to substantive enforcement mechanisms, the overarching finding of a mirror view nevertheless raises substantial questions regarding the effectiveness of purely private governance mechanisms aimed at combatting corruption.
We are aware of a number of limitations in our study. We are committed to doing the right thing and to carrying out our duties in an honest, ethical and straightforward manner, adhering to all anti-corruption principles under the law and Bank regulations.
2) Stipulations concerning relationships with stakeholders
Business partners: Grupo Bimbo, Mexico
In Grupo Bimbo we seek to obtain from Suppliers only the benefits that pertain to the negotiation in question, without gaining personal advantages for assigning contracts and for the acquisitions of goods and/or services. We want to maintain a relationship with Our Suppliers in which both parties profit.
Customers: Axis Bank, India
To maintain the spirit of fair dealings with any external body, we will refrain from the following … Payment, acceptance, offer, or authorisation of money, gifts, or any other forms of bribe and corruption with the customers.
Government officials: China Communications Services, China
In respect of the relationship with regulatory authorities or officers, the employees shall take due consideration of the anti-corrupt rules governing the government officers and control such behaviors within legal range, and it is prohibited to offer any benefits to regulatory officers that may impair his or her fair judgment. It is prohibited to bribe, directly or indirectly, any regulatory officer in the name of the Company, or take any act violating the spirit of anti-corruption/bribe regulations, or violating civil servant policies, laws, regulations and administrative rules about part-time job in companies.
3) Consequences of corruption
For the firm itself: Petronas Chemical, Malaysia An act of corruption by you has the effect of compromising the due and proper performance of your duties and the exercise of your authority, thereby undermining the integrity of the decision-making process and the decisions of PETRONAS concerning its business and affairs.
Consequences for wider society: Metalurgica Gerdau, Brazil Corruption harms society in many different ways, damaging a country's political, economic and social well-being.
4) Substantive commitment to enforcement Commitment to enforcement: MTR, Hong Kong
The Company does not tolerate any illegal or unethical acts. Anyone violating the Code of Conduct shall be subject to disciplinary action, including termination of employment for serious breaches and offences. In cases of suspected corruption or other forms of criminality, a report shall be made to the Independent Commission Against Corruption or other appropriate authorities.
Reassurance of no retaliation: Korea Electric Power, South Korea … any person who is discriminated against by reason of his or her reporting of a transgression may request protective measures and relief from said disadvantages to the person responsible for the code, the head of the belonging department, or the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission.
Additional tools mentioned in their codes of conduct: Itaú Unibanco, Brazil
The Corporate Ethics Policy (HF-5) and the Corporate Policy against Corruption and Bribery (HF-22) specify the rules applicable to gifts and contributions.
